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Abstract
Common wisdom suggests that firms with higher productivities earn higher profits and the
higher productivities of the firms benefit consumers by increasing outputs. We show that
productivity difference may not matter for outputs and profits in presence of wage bill
maximizing labor unions. Our results hold under decentralized (i.e., firm specific) and
centralized union-firm bargaining, for any degree of product differentiation and for any
bargaining power of the firms. Hence, our results have important implications for firms’
incentives for innovation.
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1. Introduction 
Common wisdom suggests that firms with higher productivities earn higher profits 
and higher productivities of the firms benefit consumers by increasing outputs. 
However, we show that these results may not hold in presence of labor unions. We 
show that if there are wage bill maximizing labor unions, the outputs and profits of 
the firms’ may be same irrespective of their productivity differences. Hence, in 
presence of wage bill maximizing labor unions, the higher productivities of the firms 
do not benefit consumers and the firms do not have incentives for improving their 
productivities. However, productivity difference matters for outputs and profit if there 
are rent maximizing unions. Our results hold under decentralized (i.e., firm specific) 
and centralized union-firm bargaining,
1 for any degree of product differentiation and 
for any bargaining power of the firms.
2 We also show that, in the case of wage bill 
maximizing labor unions, the productivity difference does not matter for the outputs 
and profits of the firms even if the marginal costs of production are increasing. 
There is a controversy about the appropriate modeling strategy for union 
behavior and the debate can be traced back to Dunlop (1944) and Ross (1948). As 
pointed out in Farber (1986), “… Dunlop was right in that it is fruitful to analyze 
labor union as maximizing a well-defined objective function but that the internal 
structure of the union and its political process, emphasized by Ross, are important 
determinants of the objective function”.  In a seminal work, Dunlop (1944) argues 
that wage bill maximization subject to the constraint imposed by the labor demand 
function is the standard case, while the subsequent works (see, e.g., Pencavel, 1984) 
consider the alternatives to wage bill maximization such as rent maximization. 
However, what the appropriate maximand for labor union is an empirical question, 
which is yet to be settled. We show that productivity difference can have significantly 
different implications for different union behavior.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. With linear marginal costs 
of production, sections 2 and 3 show the effects of the labor productivity difference 
on the outputs and profits under decentralized and centralized unionization structures. 
Section 4 discusses the case of increasing marginal costs of production. Section 5 
concludes.     
 
2. Decentralized bargaining 
Consider an economy with two firms: firm 1 and firm 2. Assume that the firms 
produce horizontally differentiated products and production requires only labor. 
Assume that firm 1 requires 1 laborer to produce one unit of output, while firm 2 
requires  1 > λ  laborers to produce one unit of output. Hence, the firms differ in labor 
productivities. 
  In this section, we assume that there are firm-specific labor unions, who 
bargain with the respective firms. We consider a right-to-manage model of labor 
union where the unions and firms bargain for the wage rates but only the firms decide 
                                                           
1 Under decentralized bargaining, union-firm bargaining takes place at the firm level, while under 
centralized bargaining, union-firm bargaining involves all unions and firms (see, e.g., Vannini and 
Bughin, 2000).  
2 If the firms have full bargaining power, the productivity difference does not matter for outputs and 
profits, since the equilibrium wage rates are equal to the reservation wage rates irrespective of the 
unions’ objective functions. We ignore this case by assigning positive bargaining power to the unions.   2
on the employment levels.
3 Assume that the reservation wage rate for each laborer is 
c. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the firms bargain with the 
respective labor unions simultaneously and the wage rates are determined. At stage 2, 
the firms produce their outputs simultaneously by hiring laborers according to their 
need, and the profits are realized. We solve the game through backward induction.   
  Assume that the inverse demand function faced by the ith firm is 
  j i i q q a P γ − − = ,  2 , 1 = i ,  j i ≠ ,        ( 1 )  
where  0 > a ,  i q  and  j q  are the outputs of firms i and  j , and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ γ  is the degree 
of product differentiation.  0 = γ  implies that the products are isolated, while  1 = γ  
implies that the products are perfect substitutes. 
  Given the wage rates  1 w  and  2 w  charged by the respective labor unions to 























q .   (2) 







































.   (3) 
The wage rates are determined by the generalized Nash bargaining between the firms 
and the firm-specific labor unions. Assume that the bargaining power of each labor 
union (and the respective firm) is α  (and respectively by  α − 1 ), where  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ α . 
Note that if  0 = α , i.e., if the unions have no bargaining power, it is trivial that the 
equilibrium wage rates are equal to the reservation wage rates of the laborers and 
therefore, do not depend on the productivity difference of the firms. Hence, to make 
our analysis non-trivial, we assume that  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ α . 
The wage rates are determined by maximizing the following expressions: 
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We assume that, under disagreements with the unions, the firms’ profits are zero. The 
maximization problems in (4) and (5) are for the rent maximizing labor unions. The 
wage bill maximizing labor unions will maximize (4) and (5) with  0 = c . 
The equilibrium wage rates for the rent maximizing labor unions are 
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The second order conditions for maximization are satisfied. 
                                                           
3 The ‘efficient bargaining’ model, which stipulates that the firms and unions bargain over the wages 
and employments, is an alternative to the right-to-manage model. See, Layard et al. (1991) for 
arguments in favor of right-to-manage models.   3
We get the equilibrium wage rates for the wage bill maximizing labor unions 
by putting  0 = c  in (6) and (7). Therefore, the equilibrium wage rates for the wage 
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Proposition 1: In case of decentralized union-firm bargaining, if the labor unions 
maximize wage bills, the equilibrium outputs and profits of firms 1 and 2 are the same 
and do not depend on the productivity difference parameter λ . 











w w . Since the marginal costs of firms 1 and 2 are  1 w   and  2 w λ  
respectively, we get that the marginal costs of the firms evaluated at the equilibrium 
wage rates are the same. Hence, it follows from (2) and (3) that the equilibrium 
outputs and profits of firms 1 and 2 are the same irrespective of the productivity 
parameter λ .                                    Q.E.D. 
 
  Note that the above result holds irrespective of the bargaining power of the 
firms and the degree of product differentiation. 
However, if the labor unions behave like rent maximizing unions, it is 
immediate from (6) and (7) that  2 1 w w λ ≠ , and therefore, the productivity difference 
matters for the equilibrium outputs and profits of the firms.  
The reasons for the above findings are as follows. The labor unions will 
choose the productivity adjusted wage rates to maximize their objective functions. 
Hence, the labor union specific to firm 1 chooses  1 w  to maximize its objective 
function, while the labor union specific to firm 2 chooses  2 w λ  to maximize its 
objective function. Notice that if we consider that the strategic variables of the labor 
unions are the productivity adjusted wage rates, the objective functions of both labor 
unions are the same when we have wage bill maximizing labor unions, i.e., when 
0 = c . As a result, in equilibrium, the productivity adjusted wage rates charged by the 
unions are the same. However, if the labor unions are rent maximizing unions, this 
symmetry about the unions’ objective functions breaks down, and creates different 
equilibrium productivity adjusted wage rates. 
Interesting implications follow immediately from Proposition 1. Since the 
productivity difference does not matter for the profits in presence of wage bill 
maximizing labor unions, the firms may not have the incentives for doing innovation 
in an economy with wage bill maximizing labor unions. Further, since the outputs are 
also independent of the productivity difference if the labor unions maximize wage 
bills, productivity difference between the firms do not affect the consumers. It is also 
expected to observe that the incentives for innovation are higher under rent 
maximizing labor unions than under wage bill maximizing labor unions.   
 
3. Centralized bargaining 
Using decentralized unionization structure, we have shown in section 2 that 
productivity difference does not matter for the outputs and profits of the firms if there 
are wage bill maximizing unions. In this section, we consider a game similar to 
section 2 with the exception that the bargaining between the firms and labor union is   4
centralized. In other words, we assume that, at stage 1, all the unions and firms 
bargain to set the wage rates  1 w  and  2 w , and, at stage 2, the firms produce their 
outputs simultaneously by hiring laborers according to their need, and the profits are 
realized. We solve the game through backward induction.    
It is important to note that, under a centralized union, we allow the union to 
charge different wage rates to the firms. Hence, centralization eliminates competition 
between the labor unions by forming a single labor union, though it keeps the 
flexibility of charging different wage rates to different firms. Therefore, following the 
terminology of Haucap and Wey (2004), centralized labor union of this section can be 
termed as “coordination” between the labor unions. 
The reason for considering wage discrimination by the centralized labor union 
can be found in Yoshida (2000), which shows that an upstream agent prefers price 
discrimination over uniform pricing if there are differences in the downstream agents.  
Therefore, it is immediate that, given the wage rates, the equilibrium outputs 
and profits of the firms are given by (2) and (3). The equilibrium wage rates are 
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The second order conditions for maximization are satisfied. 
  Subtracting (11) from (10), we get 
, 0
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which implies that, if  0 > c ,  2 1 w w λ ≠ . So, if the centralized labor union maximizes 
rent, productivity difference creates the difference in outputs and profits of the firms 
by creating different marginal costs of production for these firms. 
However, if  0 = c , (12) reduces to 
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We get that (13) holds if  2 1 w w λ = .
4 Hence, if the union is maximizing wage bills, in 
equilibrium, both firms face the same marginal cost of production, and therefore, 
productivity difference does not create the difference in outputs and profits of the 
firms.  
  To make things clearer, consider an example with  1 = α , i.e., with the full 















= . Hence, if  0 = c  (i.e., the union maximizes wage bills), the 
equilibrium outputs and profits of the firms are independent of the productivity 
differences. 
Hence, the following proposition is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 2:  The result of Proposition 1 holds under centralized union-firm 
bargaining with wage discrimination. 
 
  Note that the above proposition allows wage discrimination between the firms. 
However, it is trivial that if the centralized labor union requires to charge a uniform 
wage rate to the asymmetric producers (may be because of the institutional reasons as 
mentioned in Haucap et al., 2000 and 2001), the labor productivity matters for outputs 
and profits, irrespective of the union’s objective. Given that the firms differ in labor 
productivities, the marginal costs of the firms differ if the centralized union sets a 
uniform wage rate to the firms, thus affecting the outputs and profits of the firms. 
 
4. Increasing marginal cost of production 
So far, we have considered the case where the marginal costs of production of the 
firms are constant. The purpose of this section is to show that, if the labor unions 
maximize wage bills, the labor productivity difference may not affect the outputs and 
profits of the firms even if the marginal costs of production are increasing. To show 
this we assume that, besides labor cost, the firms need to incur other costs such as 





. Hence, the firms are symmetric in terms of the managerial expertise, 
and the marginal cost of the ith firm attributable to the managerial cost is increasing 












q w + λ . For simplicity, here we assume that  1 = α , i.e., the labor unions have 
full bargaining power. 
                                                           
4 We get that G  falls with higher α . Further, G  is negative at  1 = α , while it is positive at  0 = α .  
Hence, there is a critical α , say α , at which G  is zero irrespective of  2 1 w w λ =  or  2 1 w w λ ≠ . 
However, except α , it is necessary to have  2 1 w w λ =  for (13) to hold.     6
  To avoid repetition, we do not show the mathematical details here. However, 
it is easy to find that, given the wage rates, the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 
are respectively 
8
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If the labor unions are decentralized, the wage rates charged by the firm-










w = . Hence, it is 
immediate that the difference in labor productivities does not affect the outputs and 
profits of the firms.    









w = , which shows that the productivity difference does 
not matter for the outputs and profits of the firms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Common wisdom suggests that firms with higher productivities produce more and 
earn higher profits compared to the firms with lower productivities. We show that if 
there are wage bill maximizing labor unions, the productivity difference between the 
firms do not matter for the equilibrium outputs and profits. Hence, in this situation, 
higher productivities of the firms do not benefit consumers, and also the firms do not 
have incentives for improving their productivities. However, productivity difference 
matters for outputs and profits if there are rent maximizing unions. Our results hold 
under decentralized (i.e., firm specific) and centralized union-firm bargaining, for any 
degree of product differentiation and for any bargaining power of the firms. We also 
show that, if there are wage bill maximizing labor unions, the productivity difference 
does not affect the outputs and profits of the firms even if the marginal costs of 
production are increasing. Therefore, the innovations incentives of the firms are 
expected to be higher under rent maximizing unions than under wage bill maximizing 
unions.  
We have proved our results with linear demand functions. However, it must be 
clear that our qualitative results hold even for non-linear demand functions. We have 
seen that productivity difference does not matter if the objective functions of the 
unions are symmetric when we consider the productivity adjusted wage rates. Given 
the wage rates  1 w  and  2 w , the firms’ equilibrium outputs and labor demands depend 
on the marginal costs of production  1 w  and  2 w λ  irrespective of the type of market 
demand function. Hence, the labor demand functions are the same in terms of the 
productivity adjusted wage rates. So, if there is an asymmetry in the unions’ objective 
functions, it is due to the existence of c in the unions’ price-cost margin. Hence, 
irrespective of the type of market demand function, the unions’ objective functions 
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